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ABSTRACT 
 
Effects of Labels on Perception and its Relation to Visual Working Memory, Implicit 
Beliefs, and Metacognitive Ability. (April 2011) 
 
Amanda Carina Hahn 
Department of Psychology 
Texas A&M University 
 
Research Advisor: Dr. Takashi Yamauchi 
Department of Psychology 
 
Labels hold a great amount of information and power, and they have been shown to 
affect perception and people‟s decisions when making categorical and similarity 
judgments. This study examines why reliance on labels found in previous studies is so 
common by exploring cognitive processes behind this labeling effect. We study how 
poor short-term visual memory, general assumptions, and an ability to think critically 
about one‟s own thinking relate to label use. Specifically, we investigated how visual 
working memory (VWM) ability, implicit beliefs, and metacognitive ability influence a 
participants‟ use of labels during a similarity judgment task. Participants were given a 
task to determine similarity between human faces. They were also given a VWM task 
and questionnaires to determine their implicit beliefs and metacognitive abilities. Our 
results indicate that VWM ability and implicit beliefs relate to the use of labels in certain 
conditions, with those having poor VWM ability using labels more and those whose 
implicit beliefs reflect an assumption that properties and traits in the world are fixed and 
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intransient use labels more. Metacognitive abilities were not closely related to label use. 
These results suggest that the use of labels is not random or out of ease of use, but the 
result of certain cognitive processes. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The power of labels 
When introduced to novel items, people use cues in order to assimilate those items into 
previously formed categories. We categorize items in a variety of ways such as living or 
non-living, according to color and shape, or by how the item is used. Language plays a 
key role in categorization through labeling because labels are one of the indicators 
people use to make categorical decisions. People make generalizations based on labels 
assigned to an object. For example, by knowing an object is called “oven”, we make 
assumptions about the object (e.g. it is found in the kitchen; it is used for cooking or 
crafts; it can be dangerous, etc.). Likewise, giving labels such as “Hispanic” or 
“feminist” to people cause others to make generalizations about them, sometimes faulty 
ones. However, not everyone makes these generalizations to the same degree. What 
causes some people to use labels to generalize more than others? 
 
Previous research has shown labels to be very powerful, and they affect a variety of 
categorical judgments in both adults and children (Goldstone, 1994, 1995; Livingston, 
Andrews, & Harnad, 1998; Rips, 1989; Yamauchi, Kohn, & Yu, 2007; Yamauchi & Yu, 
_______________ 
This thesis follows the style of Memory and Cognition. 
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2008). Even on something as complex as a human face, labels have been shown to affect 
categorical perception of both familiar and unfamiliar faces (Kikutani, Roberson, & 
Hanley, 2008). They can even go as far as to change people‟s actual perceptions of items 
as shown by participants‟ similarity judgments of images (Lara, 2009; Yu, Yamauchi, & 
Schumacher, 2008). For example, when two faces shared a label, subjects judged the two 
faces to be more similar than when the same faces were shown without labels in Lara 
(2009). Although much research has been done on the power of labels themselves, this 
present study seeks to find source of labels‟ power by exploring which cognitive 
processes are more closely related to a reliance on labels during a similarity judgment 
task of human faces. 
 
The cognitive processes investigated in this study are short-term memory for visual 
information, general assumptions, and the ability to analyze one‟s own thinking and 
abilities. In what follows, previous research on these processes and how these factors 
relate to label use are explained. The experiments to test how these factors interact with 
label use and subsequent results are also explained. 
 
Factors influencing label use 
Visual working memory 
One explanation for the strong effect of labels may be that some individuals have a 
smaller capacity for visual information. The evidence supporting the existence of a 
visual working memory (VWM) system is well established (Baddeley, 2003; Sternberg, 
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1966). Individuals differ in their ability to process this visual information (Luck & 
Vogel, 1997; Palmer, 1990; Vogel, Woodman, & Luck, 2001). The capacity to hold 
incoming information can be measured with a VWM task, which we use in this study 
(Luck & Vogel, 1997). Furthermore, research shows that there are different systems in 
the brain for visual and verbal information that interact and sometimes compete, such as 
when identifying labels is interrupted by processing visual information as demonstrated 
by the Stroop Test (Baddeley, 1992; Morey & Cowan, 2004; Stroop 1935). Thus, we 
suggest that individuals with a smaller capacity for visual information will rely on verbal 
information and therefore rely on labels during the similarity task more often. However, 
when testing these relationships, the order of the experiments needed to be presented 
carefully. Presenting the VWM task before the similarity judgment task may cause 
fatigue, resulting in an increased label use. This finding would suggest that labels are 
used as a result of conserving cognitive resources. Also, if the similarity judgment task is 
presented before the VWM task, this may cause fatigue as well and result in poor VWM 
performance, which may lead to misleading correlations. Therefore in Experiment 2 of 
this study, we manipulate the order in which materials are presented to test for any 
ordering effects. 
 
Implicit beliefs 
In addition to visual working memory, we tested people‟s general assumptions about 
traits and features. People believe surface features are representative of deep, stable, and 
innate properties of an item (Gelman, Heyman & Legare, 2007; Medin & Ortony, 1989).  
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Also, previous research suggests that labels themselves act as an important indicator in 
determining categorical membership and innate qualities of different items (Yamauchi & 
Yu, 2008; Yu et al., 2008). However, individuals do not all share the same beliefs and 
assumptions regarding innate, deeper properties of items, and those beliefs and 
assumptions can affect the way people remember and categorize items, including faces 
(Eberhardt, Dasgupta, & Banaszynski, 2003; Gelman & Diesendruck, 1999; Haslam, 
Bastian, Bain, Kashima, 2006). One way of describing these assumptions is in terms of a 
person‟s implicit beliefs. Social psychology studies have shown that some individuals 
view features in the world as being fixed and rigid while others view features as being 
more malleable and flexible (Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995; Haslam, Rothschild, Ernst, 
2000). How labels and these beliefs relate to and are perhaps influence each other is a 
topic of focus in this study. We believe that those who hold assumptions that properties 
are unchanging will be more influenced by labels during similarity judgments due to a 
belief that those labels reflect deep, innate properties.  
 
Metacognitive ability 
In addition, we investigated how higher level cognitive processes could relate to label 
use. Subjects were given a questionnaire asking them to estimate their own performance 
on the VWM task following the format of Kruger & Dunning (1999). We theorize that 
one reason people rely on labels is their ease of use, and subjects may not be analyzing 
their own thought processes very thoroughly, and are therefore basing similarity not on 
physical features of complex human faces, but on the given label. 
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Overview of experiments 
First, a pilot study was completed in which only the similarity judgment and VWM task 
were administered. This was done to determine whether labels in the judgment task in 
the present study would affect people‟s decisions as they had in previous studies. Also, 
the difficulty of the VWM task needed to be tested to ensure that the task was not so 
difficult or so easy that there was little variability within subjects and a poor test of 
VWM ability. After these measures were analyzed and results were found to be as 
expected, these two tasks were given along with the implicit beliefs and metacognitive 
questionnaires in Experiment 1. In Experiment 2, we tested how the order in which the 
tasks were presented affected label use. Explanation and results are explained further.  
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CHAPTER II 
METHODS 
 
General method 
Overview 
In the experiments reported, all subjects were undergraduate students participating for 
course credit. They were shown stimuli and made responses on Dell desktop computers. 
If they completed the similarity judgment task, they were assigned to one of two 
conditions: they were either told the labels signified diseases (disease condition) or last 
names (last name condition).   
 
Materials 
Participants viewed triads of human face pictures (Figure 1).  To create stimuli, four 
pairs of photographed human face pictures were selected (Figure 2). Each pair of 
original faces was merged using MorphMan 4.0 (2003) software. Altogether, 80 
morphed pictures were created from four sets of original pictures (18 degrees of 
morphed pictures for each of four pairs) (Figure 3). From the morphed pictures, three 
levels of physical difference―low-, medium-, and high-difference―were created based 
on the degree of merging of the two original pictures. In the low-difference condition, 
the two base pictures were not very different; in the medium-difference condition, the 
two base pictures were moderately different; and in the high-difference condition, the 
two base pictures were highly different. Two sets of base pictures were randomly 
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selected at each level of physical difference and were combined with two original 
pictures in each pair, yielding 12 triads for each pair (a total of 48 triads = 4 face pairs × 
12 triads). In each trial, the target was always an original picture, and the two base 
pictures were morphed images of two original pictures.  
 
Participants were also presented with a VWM task. For the task, 40 arrays were created 
that consisted of a gray square with eight smaller squares within (Figure 4). Each array 
had a corresponding “different” array (one square was a different color than the sample 
array) for a total of eighty arrays. Participants were shown all original squares that were 
made with a gray 4 in. by 4 in. template on PhotoDraw software with a 0.5 in. by 0.5 in. 
grid over it, creating sixty-four cells. This acted as a template to create the arrays. Eight 
colored 0.5 in. by 0.5 in. squares were placed randomly within the sixty-four cells. These 
squares were also created on PhotoDraw software using the RGB color model. Each 
square color was chosen at random on Microsoft Excel and was either red (255 Red), 
blue (255 Blue), green (255 Green), yellow (255 Red, 255 Green), violet (204 Red, 204 
Blue), white (255 Red, 255 Blue, 255 Green), or black (0 Red, 0 Blue, 0 Green). The 
gray background was made up of 203 Red, 203 Blue, and 203 Green. After the square 
colors were determined, the location within the eight cell by eight cell grid on the 
template was selected at random on Microsoft Excel. Because no two squares could be 
directly adjacent to another, square assignments were manually adjusted to meet this 
condition after locations were randomly determined. The rules for adjustments were as 
follows: Each square was assigned a number, according to the order in which it was 
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created. The lower square number has dominance. (e.g. if Square 1 and 2 were assigned 
next to each other, Square 2 was moved), and the decision to move a square or not is 
made in order of square number (e.g. if Square 2 and 3 are adjacent to two different 
squares, Square 2 would be moved first and then Square 3 would be moved and placed 
according to the new placement of Square 2). To move squares when manually 
adjusting, the square was first shifted one cell to the right. If it was still adjacent to a 
square, it was moved to the right again. If needed, the square continued to be moved one 
cell by one cell to the right, until either the square was no longer adjacent to other 
squares or until the end of the grid was reached. If no proper spot had been found, the 
square was moved down one by one with the same method. If needed, it was moved left 
one by one and finally up one by one if necessary. After colors and positions were 
assigned and placed onto the template, the grid was deleted. Using E-Prime software, the 
array was resized to have a width of 128 pixels and a height of 131 pixels so that it was 
6.1 cm by 6.1 cm on each computer monitor.  
 
Design 
The similarity judgment task in the pilot study had a 2 (Label Condition; no-label vs. 
same-label conditions; within-subjects) × 2 (Label Type; Disease-label vs. Last Name-
label; between-subjects) × 3 (Physical Difference; low-difference, medium-difference, 
high-difference; within-subjects) factorial design. The dependent measure was the 
proportion of participants selecting the dissimilar base pictures as more similar to the 
target than the other base pictures. The meaning for the labels was described only in the 
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introductory instructions. The labels between each condition were physically the same, 
but expressed meaning of the labels was altered.  
The VWM experiment had a within-subjects design. Each participant completed 80 trials 
with each trial consisting of an array being displayed followed by a second array. 
Subjects were to determine whether or not the two arrays were the same or different. The 
dependent measure was the subject‟s accuracy in this decision.  
 
Procedure  
During the similarity judgment task, forty-eight triads of pictures were presented to 
participants one at a time at the center of the computer screen. Participants were asked to 
select the base picture that they judged to be more similar to the target than the other 
base picture. They indicated their responses by pressing the left or right arrow key on the 
keyboard. The order of presenting stimuli was determined randomly. The dissimilar base 
picture was presented on the left or the right side an equal number of times. The 
experiment lasted about 10 minutes.  
 
In the VWM task, each participant completed 80 trials after four practice trials. To begin 
each trial, participants were prompted to press the space bar to begin the trial when 
ready. After pressing the space bar, a gray screen with a black, cross mark fixation point 
was displayed for 500 ms. Then the first array was displayed for 100 ms. The 
presentation order was randomized for these arrays. A blank delay consisting of a gray 
square for 900 ms followed; then a second array was displayed for 2,000 ms (Figure 4). 
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In half of the trials, the second array was identical to the first; in the other half, the arrays 
were different (one square color was changed). If subjects did not make a decision 
during the time in which the second array was displayed, a blank, gray screen appeared 
for 5,000 ms during which subjects could still make a response. Finally, if the participant 
had yet to respond, a final screen instructing the participant to make a decision was 
displayed until the subject responded. Decisions were made by selecting the „S‟ key on 
the keyboard if the arrays believed to be the same, and the „D‟ key if different. 
 
Pilot study 
In this experiment, we explored only the effects of labeling and its relationship to VWM. 
 
Participants 
 A total of 106 undergraduate students participated. Of these students, 102 of them 
completed the similarity judgment task. There were 50 participants assigned to the 
disease condition and 52 were assigned to the last name condition.  Fifty-nine of these 
students also completed a VWM task. A few students (n = 3) took only the VWM task. 
 
Design 
In this pilot study, the similarity judgment task preceded the VWM task. 
 
Experiment 1 
This experiment is identical to the pilot study except that an implicit beliefs 
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questionnaire and a metacognitive survey were added to the experiment. 
 
Participants 
 A total of 152 undergraduate students participated for course credit. In this experiment, 
151 of these students completed the similarity judgment task; 77 were assigned to the 
disease condition and 74 were assigned to the last name condition. Of these participants 
who took the labeling task, 58 also completed a VWM task. Only one subject took only 
the VWM task without the similarity judgment task. Subjects also completed an implicit 
beliefs questionnaire (n=74) and a metacognitive survey (n=74).  
 
Material and design 
In experiment 1, the similarity judgment task came first, followed by the implicit beliefs 
questionnaire, the VWM task, and finally the metacognitive survey. All surveys and 
questionnaires were created and displayed using Microsoft Excel (Figure 5). The 
implicit beliefs questionnaire contained 9 items. The questions were a measure of 
implicit beliefs regarding world views, morality, and intelligence. Subjects read a 
statement and gave a rating between 1 (strongly disagree) and 7 (strongly agree). Higher 
ratings suggest stronger beliefs that traits and characteristics are flexible entities. The 
metacognitive survey consisted of three questions to measure the participant‟s ability to 
judge their own capabilities on the VWM task.  
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Procedure 
The procedures for the labeling and VWM tasks were identical to the pilot study. The 
implicit beliefs questionnaire was given after the similarity judgment task. Options to 
respond were given in a multiple choice format. Subjects chose one rating on a seven 
point scale ranging between 1 and 7. Each question was displayed one at a time. The 
order of these questions was randomized. Participants were not allowed to move on to 
the next question without responding. After completing this survey, subjects took the 
VWM task and finally the metacognitive questionnaire. This questionnaire consisted of 
three questions each displayed one at a time. Subjects were to type in their responses on 
the same screen.  
 
Experiment 2 
Potential effects of presentation order were tested in this experiment. There were two 
conditions. In the first, the order was identical to that of Experiment 1. In the second 
condition, the VWM task was presented before the labeling experiment. 
 
Participants 
In this experiment, 155 subjects completed the labeling task. Subjects were also assigned 
either the disease condition (n =76) or the last name condition (n =79). A total of 163 
subjects took the VWM task. Of these subjects, 116 of them also took the similarity 
judgment task. Among these subjects, a total of 70 participants took the similarity 
  13 
judgment task before the VWM task, and 46 of them took the labeling experiment after 
the VWM task.  
 
Materials and design  
Materials and design were identical to those in Experiment 1. The only difference was 
that the order varied between participants. Some subjects (n = 96) completed the 
experiment in the following order: 1) Similarity judgment task 2) Implicit beliefs 
questionnaire, 3) VWM task, and 4) Metacognitive questionnaire, while others (n = 62) 
completed the experiment in the following order: 1) VWM task, 2) Metacognitive 
questionnaire 3) Implicit beliefs questionnaire, and 4) Similarity judgment task. 
 
Procedure 
The procedure in Experiment 2 is identical to Experiment 1, except for the variations in 
ordering. 
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CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
 
Similarity judgment task  
Pilot study 
We measured the frequency in which a subject selected the dissimilar base face as being 
more similar to the target face as a proportion (Figure 6). Participants selected the 
dissimilar picture with a label in the disease condition (M = .32, SD = .19) significantly 
more frequently than when the dissimilar picture was shown with a label in the last name 
condition (M = .23, SD = .11). On trials shown with no labels, the difference between 
selecting the dissimilar picture in the disease condition (M = .17, SD = .07) was not 
significantly different than in the last name condition (M = .18, SD = .07). Label use was 
measured by subtracting the frequency of selecting the dissimilar face when there were 
labels present from the frequency of selecting the dissimilar face when there were no 
labels present.  Overall, label use was higher when the faces were shown with labels than 
when they were shown without labels, t (101) = -5.69, SE = 0.02, p < .01. This was true 
across all levels of physical differences: low-difference, t(101) = -4.65, SE = 0.03, p < 
.01, medium- difference, t(101) = -4.53, SE = 0.02, p < .01, high- difference,  t(101) = -
3.55, SE = 0.02, p < .01. Also, although a labeling effect, as measured by label use, was 
found in both the disease (M = .14, SD = .20) and last name conditions (M = .05, SD = 
.12), labels were used in the disease condition was used significantly more than in the 
last name condition, t(100) = 2.65, SE = 0.03, p < .01. 
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Experiment 1   
We measured the frequency in the same manner as in the pilot study, and label use was 
measured in the same way as well. When labels were given to the faces, similarity 
judgments changed significantly (Figure 6). In the disease condition, participants 
selected the dissimilar picture when the faces were labeled (M = .29, SD = .23) more 
frequently than when faces were shown without labels (M = .19, SD = .07). This was 
true in the last name condition as well, with subjects selecting the dissimilar picture as 
being more similar to the target when the faces were labeled (M = .27, SD = .13) more 
often than when they were not labeled (M = .19, SD = .05). Overall, subjects‟ label use 
was significantly higher when labels were present compared to when there were no 
labels, t(150) = -5.70, SE = 0.02, p < .01.  This effect was significant in all levels of 
physical differences: low- difference, t(150) = -4.85, SE = 0.02, p < .01, medium- 
difference, t(150), = -3.91, SE = 0.02, p < .01, high- difference, t(150) = -4.09, SE = 
0.02, p < .01. This labeling effect as measured by label use (the difference in frequency 
of selecting the dissimilar face when there were labels and when there were no labels) 
was found in both the disease (M = 0.10, SD = 0.21) and last name (M = 0.08, SD = 
0.18) conditions. Contrary to previous experiments, the difference of label use between 
the two conditions was indistinguishable: t(149) = 0.59, SE = 0.03, p = .55.  
 
Experiment 2 
Label use was measured in the same manner as in the Pilot Experiment and Experiment 
1. As in the former experiments, across all conditions, the frequency of selecting the 
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dissimilar picture was higher with labels present than without, t(157) = -4.30, SE = 0.01, 
p < .01 (Figure 6). With labels present, in the Judgment 1st  condition, the frequency of 
selecting the dissimilar picture in the disease condition (M = .25, SD = .14) was higher 
when there were labels than when there were not (M = .18, SD = .09). This was the case 
in the last name condition as well when comparing the selection of the dissimilar 
pictures with labels (M = .23, SD = .12) and without (M = .20, SD = .06).  In the 
Judgment 2nd condition (the similarity judgment task was given after the VWM task), the 
difference in selecting the dissimilar picture when subjects were told the labels signified 
a disease carried was not as great as previous experiments when comparing the 
frequency of selecting the dissimilar picture when there were labels (M = .22, SD = .10) 
and when there were not (M = .20, SD = .06). In the last name condition subjects 
selected the dissimilar picture when there were labels more frequently than seen in 
previous experiments  (M = .27, SD = .13), but the frequency of selecting the dissimilar 
picture when there were no labels was comparable to the previous experiments (M = .19, 
SD = .09).  Similar to Experiment 1, in the Judgment 1st condition of Experiment 2 (the 
similarity judgment task was given before the VWM task), label use did not vary 
significantly in the disease condition (M = 0.07, SD = 0.17) as opposed to the last name 
condition (M = 0.15, SD = 0.14), t(94) = 1.21, SE = 0.03, p = .23. In the Judgment 2nd 
condition, label use did not vary significantly between the disease condition (M =  0.01, 
SD = 0.10) and last name condition (M = 0.08, SD = 0.16), t(60), SE = 0.04, p = .07. 
However, unlike previous studies and the previous experiments within this study, in the 
Judgment 2nd condition, the label effect was greater in the last name condition than in the 
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disease condition. Furthermore, label use in the disease condition was significantly 
greater in the Judgment 1st condition (N = 39, M = 0.10, SD = 0.19) than in the Judgment 
2nd condition (N = 18, M = .01, SD = 0.12), t(55) = 1.97, SE = .05, p = .05. In the last 
name condition, the differences in label use between the Judgment 1st (N = 31, M = 0.01, 
SD = 0.14) and Judgment 2nd (N = 28, M = 0.08, SD = 0.16) conditions were not 
significant, t(57) = -1.64, SE = 0.04, p = .11.  
 
Visual working memory (VWM) task 
Pilot study 
A total of 59 participants took the VWM task along with the labeling task in the pilot 
study. Analysis was done on these individuals. In the pilot study, VWM ability 
determined by measuring the percent of trials answered correctly (M = 68.28, SD = 
11.82). There were no differences in VWM ability between disease and last name 
conditions, t(57) = -0.98, SE = 0.03, p = .33. Correlations between VWM ability and 
label use were found (Figure 7a). Overall, there was not a significant correlation between 
the two, r(59) = .04, p = .77. The relationship between VWM ability and label use in the 
disease condition, r(59) = -.07, p = .72, was weaker than the relationship between VWM 
ability and label use in the last name condition, r(59) = .28, p = .13. However, the 
correlation between VWM ability and label use was still not significant in the latter 
condition.  
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Experiment 1  
As in the pilot study, the VWM task followed the similarity judgment task in Experiment 
1. A total of 57 participants took both the VWM Additional measures were taken in this 
portion of the study however. VWM ability was measured by analyzing the percent of 
trials answered correctly as well as a measure of Hits – False Alarms (H – FA), d’, and 
K. In all of these, higher values within each measure indicate better performance.  
 
We will discuss percent correct first. This is the percent of trials in which the subject 
answered correctly, meaning they correctly identified the two arrays as being the same (a 
Hit or H) or correctly identified the two arrays as being different (a Correct Rejection, or 
C). On average, participants answered 71.12 percent of the trials correctly. The 
correlation between overall label use and percent correct was calculated, r(58) = -.14, p 
= .30. The correlation between the percent correct and the disease condition was also not 
significant, r(30) = -.03, p = .88. Although the correlation was stronger between percent 
correct and last name label use, it was not significant, r(28) = -.18, p = .35 (Figure 7b).  
 
The second measure taken was H – FA. This measure is the number of Hits (the number 
of times a participant correctly identified the two arrays in the VWM task as being the 
same) minus the False Alarms (the number of times a participant judged the two arrays 
to be the same when they actually differed). The highest obtainable score is 40 because 
there are 40 trials in which the two arrays are the same. A score of 40 would mean the 
participant correctly spotted every trial in which the two arrays were the same and never 
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obtained any false alarms, meaning the participant correctly determined every trial in 
which the two arrays were different. On average, the H – FA value was 16.90 with a 
standard deviation of 5.01. Correlations were taken between H – FA and label use. 
Overall, there was not a significant correlation between the two, r(58) = -.14, p = .30. As 
in comparisons with percent correct, further analysis was done by comparing VWM 
ability with specific labels. When comparing H – FA results with only the disease 
condition, there was no correlation, r(30) = -.03, p = .88. The correlation between H – 
FA and label use was stronger in the last name condition, but not significant, r(28) = -
.18, p = .36.  
 
A d’ measure was taken as well. This value is the probability of a participant obtaining a 
hit based on his or her performance, HP, minus the probability of a participant getting 
false alarm, FP. This is a measure intended to account for a participant‟s tendency or 
bias to, when unsure, judge the arrays as being the same more often than judging them to 
be different or vice versa. The highest possible d’ score is 4.65. In Experiment 1, the 
average d’ score was 1.30, Overall, a correlation of r(58) = -.14, p = .30 between label 
use and d’ was found. Correlations between d’ and label use were also taken for specific 
labels: disease condition: r(30) = -.02, p = .91, last name condition: r(28) = -.18, p = .35.  
 
The final measure taken was K, which is the number of items a participant can hold in 
memory. The formula for K as explained in Vogel, Woodman, and Luck (2006) is K = 
CR × [S × (HR – FR) / (1 – FR)], where CR is the correct rejection rate of a participant 
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(proportion of correctly determining the two arrays are different), S is the set size (or the 
number of squares in the array. In the case of this experiment, there were always eight 
colored squares), HR is the hit rate and FR is the false alarm rate. This formula is 
intended to account for guessing. The average number of items subjects were able to 
hold was 3.38 items with a standard deviation of 1.00. Previous studies have found the 
capacity of items held in short term visual memory to be 4 (Luck & Vogel, 1997; Cowan 
2000; Vogel, Woodman, & Luck, 2006) so this result is not unexpected. As with 
previous measures, the correlation between K  and label use was found: overall, r(58)= -
.137, p = .30, disease condition, r(30) = -0.03, p = .88, last name condition, r(28) = -.18, 
p = .36.  
 
Experiment 2 
 A total of 116 participants took the VWM task along with the similarity judgment task. 
Of these, 70 participants took the similarity judgment task before the VWM task, and 46 
participants took the similarity judgment task after the VWM task. VWM ability was 
measured using the same means as Experiment 1, and correlations were found in the 
same manner as well. Average values for VWM ability were lower overall than in 
Experiment 1 and were the following: percent correct, M = 68.44, SD = 8.52; H – FA, M 
= 14.74, SD = 6.81; d’, M = 1.11, SD = 0.56; K, M = 2.95, SD = 1.36. Overall, within 
Experiment 2, no significant correlations were found between VWM ability and label 
use: percent correct, H – FA, d‟, and K each resulted in the following correlation with 
label use: r(116) = -.s13, p = .17. However, it is noteworthy that the all correlations 
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between VWM ability and label use in the Judgment 1st disease condition were weaker 
than with those in the Judgment 1st last name condition (Figure 7). Correlations between 
disease label use and VWM ability were as follows: label use– vs. percent correct, r(39) 
= -.18, p = .28, vs. H – FA, r(39) = -.18, p = .28, vs. d’, r(39) = -.15, p = .36, vs. K, r(39) 
= -.18, p = .28. These are weaker correlations than those found between last name label 
use and VWM ability: last name label use– vs. percent correct, r(31) = -.21, p = .26, vs. 
H – FA, r(31) = -.21, p = .26, vs. d’, r(31) = -.27, p = .14, vs. K, r(31) = -.21, p = .26.  
 
Implicit beliefs 
Experiment 1 
Along with label use and VWM ability, we measured the extent to which people believe 
that one‟s intelligence, one‟s sense of morality, or traits in the world can be changed 
(fixed/flexible implicit belief) using a questionnaire with a 7 point scale. Higher values 
for these measurements indicated more flexible implicit beliefs than low values. 
 
A total of 69 participants completed the implicit beliefs questionnaire along with the 
similarity judgment task, and these were the participants used in the analysis. The 
average ratings for the fixed nature of different qualities were measured: intelligence, M 
= 4.16, SD = 1.09, morality, M = 3.96, SD = 1.14, world, M = 3.43, SD = 0.90. 
Correlations between the different beliefs were significant. Overall, correlations between 
label use and implicit beliefs were significant between intelligence beliefs and label use, 
r(69) = .28, p < .05, and between world beliefs and label use, r(69) = .44, p < .01. 
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However beliefs regarding morality were not closely correlated with label use, r(69) = 
.14, p = .25. Correlations were also taken between implicit beliefs and each label 
condition (Figure 8): disease label use vs.– intelligence, r(36) = .28, p = .10, morality, 
r(36) = .21, p = .22, world = .49, p < .01. Here, the correlation between the disease label 
and implicit beliefs were only significant within world beliefs. This was also the case in 
the last name condition: last name label use vs.– intelligence, r(33) = .25, p = .17, 
morality, r(33) = .06, p = .75, world, r(33) = .42, p < .05. Although correlations with 
label use varied between label conditions, there were not significant differences between 
the disease and last name conditions regarding beliefs pertaining to intelligence, t(67) = -
1.09, SE = 0.26, p = .28, morality, t(67) = -0.48, SE = 0.28, p = .63, or the world t(67) = 
0.81, SE = 0.22, p = .42.  
 
Experiment 2 
 A total of 155 participants completed both the similarity judgment task and the implicit 
beliefs questionnaire, and only these are used in the analysis. The averages for beliefs 
regarding intelligence (M = 4.06, SD = 1.14), morality (M = 3.71, SD = 1.04), and the 
world (M = 3.28, SD = 0.90) are comparable to those in Experiment 1. These beliefs 
were also significantly correlated. Overall, unlike in Experiment 1, correlations between 
label use and implicit beliefs were not closely correlated: Label use vs.– intelligence 
r(155) = .09, p = .28, morality, r(155) = .08, p = .33, and the world r(155) = .06, p = .45. 
Further analysis was performed to compare implicit beliefs with each labeling condition 
(Figure 8). When comparing the use of labels in the disease condition of the Judgment 
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1st task, there were not significant correlations between label use and beliefs regarding 
intelligence, r(53) = -.10, p = .49, morality r(53) = -.17, p = .24, or the world, r(53) = 
.02, p = .87. However, significant correlations between use of last name labels in the 
Judgment 1st condition and implicit beliefs were found regarding assumptions about 
intelligence, r(42) = .37, p = .02, and morality, r(42) = .36, p = .02, but not the world, 
r(42) = .21, p = .18. In the disease condition of the Judgment 2nd condition, there were 
not significant correlations between label use and beliefs pertaining to intelligence, r(24) 
= .18, p = .41, morality, r(24) = .37, p = .08, or the world, r(24) = .15, p = .50. The 
absence of significant correlations was also found in the between last name label use and 
implicit beliefs in the Judgment 2nd condition: label use vs.– intelligence, r(36) = .02, p = 
.91, morality r(36) = .13, p = .44, and the world, r(36) = -.08, p = .65.  
 
Metacognitive ability 
Experiment 1   
Metacognitive ability was measured by determining the differences between a 
participant‟s actual percentile ranking on the VWM task from the estimated percentile 
ranking of the participant. Percentiles were determined based on the participant‟s d’ 
score. The absolute value of the difference between actual and estimated percentiles was 
obtained, the percentile accuracy. Lower values indicate a closer prediction to actual 
results and therefore better metacognitive ability. The same was done for the actual and 
estimated number of trials answered correctly on the VWM task, the number accuracy. 
Those with close estimations were said to have better metacognitive ability. The average 
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percentile accuracy was 27.91 with a standard deviation of 17.22. The average number 
accuracy was 10.11 with a standard deviation of 9.87. Overall, correlations between 
label use and metacognitive ability were not significant: label use vs. percentile 
accuracy, r(55) = .13, p = .33, label use vs. number accuracy, r(55) = -.09, p = .54. This 
was the case when analyzing metacognitive ability compared to only the disease 
condition as well: percentile accuracy, r(28) = -.02, p = .93, number accuracy, r(28) = -
.01, p = .95 (Figure 9a).  Also, although correlations were stronger between 
metacognitive abilities and label use in the last name condition, correlations were not 
significant: percentile accuracy, r(27) = .25, p = .21, number accuracy, r(27) = -.11, p = 
.60 (Figure 9b).  
 
Experiment 2 
Metacognitive ability was determined using the same methods as Experiment 1.  The 
percentile accuracy (N = 119, M = 27.27, SD = 19.77) and number accuracy (N = 119, M 
= 13.72, SD = 11.32) were calculated. As in Experiment 1, correlations between these 
values and label use were found (Figure 9). Overall, neither the correlation between label 
use and percentile accuracy, r(119) = .04, p = .66, nor the correlation between label use 
and number accuracy, r(119) = -.02, p = .83, resulted in significant correlations. An 
analysis of disease label use in the Judgment 1st condition did not result in significant 
correlations when compared with percentile accuracy, r(41) = .15, p = .34, or number 
accuracy, r(41) = .07, p = .66. This was also the case when comparing last name label 
use in the Judgment 1st condition with percentile accuracy, r(31) = .15, p = .43 and 
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number accuracy, r(31) = .26, p = .22. Correlations were stronger between the use of the 
disease label in the Judgment 2nd condition and percentile accuracy, r(19) = -.39, p = .10, 
and number accuracy, r(19) = -.27, p = .26, however neither were significant. 
Correlations between last name label use in the Judgment 2nd condition were weaker 
than disease label use in the same condition compared to both percentile accuracy, r(28) 
= -.01, p = .97, and number accuracy r(28) = -.19, p = .34.  
 
Additional analysis 
The experimental method for Experiment 1 and the Judgment 1st condition of 
Experiment 2 were identical. Therefore, in order to increase the amount of participants in 
the analysis for increased accuracy, we grouped together the results of these two 
experimental conditions. The results are described below.  
 
Similarity judgment task 
As found in the individual experiments, the effect of labels is clearly seen. From 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, a total of 247 participants completed the similarity 
judgment task before the VWM task. Overall, when labels were present, subjects‟ label 
use were significantly higher than when no labels were present, t (246) = 6.48, SE = .01, 
p < .01. This labeling effect was significant in all levels of physical differences: low-
difference, t(246) = 5.23, SE = .01, p < .01, medium-difference, t(246) = 4.73, SE = .01, 
p <.01, high-difference, t(246) = 4.64, SE = .01, p <.01, F(1, 245) = 1.21, MSE = .03, p = 
.27, 2 = .004.  
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 Visual working memory task 
A total of 133 participants took the VWM task along with the labeling task and analysis 
on VWM ability was done only on these participants for this section. VWM ability was 
not different between the disease condition compared to those in the last name condition 
in H – FA, t(131) = 1.08, SE = .09, p = .28, d’, t(131) = 0.53, SE = 1.11, p = .60,  , or K, 
t(131) = 0.55, SE = 0.22, p = .68, however it was for percent correct, t(131) = 2.24, SE =  
1.41, p = .03.  
 With the results from Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 combined, as predicted, 
participants with smaller visual working memory spans tended to use category labels 
more in the similarity judgment task. VWM ability (percent correct, H – FA, d’ and K) 
and label use showed a significantly negative correlation (Figure 10): percent correct and 
label use r(133) = -.17, p = .06, H – FA and label use: r(133) = -.17, p = .06, d’ and label 
use: r(133) = -.17, p =.06, K and label use: r(133) = -.165, p < .06.  The negative 
correlation was found in both the disease and last name condition.  
 Implicit beliefs  
The values on intelligence, morality, and world were highly correlated to each other: 
intelligence and morality, r(164) = .25, p <.01, intelligence and world, r(164) = .38, p 
<.01, and morality and world, r(164) = .33, p <.01. Participants in the disease condition 
did not differ from those in the last name condition in their implicit belief about one‟s 
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intelligence, t (162) = .13, SE = .18, p = .89), one‟s morality, t (162) = -.27, SE = .17, p = 
.79, and our world, t (162) = .95, SE = .14, p = .34. 
 
Participants with flexible implicit beliefs tended to use labels more than participants with 
fixed beliefs (Figure 11). The more a participant thought one‟s intelligence can be 
changed rather than being fixed, the tendency to use labels increased r(164) = .17, p 
<.05. This was also true among those who think our world can be changed r(164) = .23, 
p <.005. There was no correlation between beliefs on one‟s morality and label use, 
r(164) = .08, p = .30.  
 
The positive relationship between label use and flexible implicit beliefs was stronger 
when the label indicated diseases compared to when the labels indicated last names. 
When labels indicated last names, label use increased as participants believed that one‟s 
intelligence can be changed, r(75) = .33, p <.01, that one‟s morality can be changed, 
r(75) = .24, p <.05, and that our world can be changed, r(75) = .30, p <.01. However, 
when labels indicated diseases, label use was not related to people‟s beliefs about 
intelligence and morality: label use and intelligence scores, r(89) = .04, p = .70, label 
use and morality scores, r(89) = -.03, p =.75, and label use and world scores r(89) = .18, 
p =.10. It was our hypothesis that those with more fixed beliefs would use labels more, 
so these findings were not as predicted.  
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Metacognitive ability 
A total of 127 participants‟ metacognitive abilities were also measured with a 
questionnaire. Those with closer estimations of their own performance on the VWM task 
suggest higher metacognitive abilities. As described, we asked subjects to estimate in 
which percentile they belong (M = 57.51, SD = 18.95) on the VWM task compared to 
other participants who completed the same task. We also asked them to estimate their 
how many trials they believed they answered correctly on the VWM task, M = 55.84, 
SD = 14.38. In order to measure metacognitive ability, we found the absolute value of 
the difference between subjects‟ estimated percentiles and actual percentiles, M = 27.17, 
SD =18.63. We also found the absolute value of the difference between their estimated 
number of trials answered correctly and the actual number of trials answered correctly, 
M =11.82, SD = 10.06. Metacognitive ability was not significantly correlated with label 
use in both estimations of percentile rankings: r(127) = .13, p = .14, and number of trials 
answered correctly: r(127) = .03,  p = .73 (Figure 12). 
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CHAPTER IV 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Summary 
As discussed, labels have shown to have large effects on decisions, and some labels tend 
to have a greater affect than others. Based on the results of the pilot study, it seemed as 
though the disease label would be a stronger, more powerful label throughout the 
experiment. It was used with greater frequency in this study which was consistent with 
previous findings by Lara (2009), and we hypothesized that the disease label would 
continue to have a larger effect on judgments because people feel it is more meaningful 
and constant than a last name. However, unexpectedly, as we continued to administer the 
experiment, this difference between the two labels began to disappear. Label use was 
nearly equivalent between the disease and last name conditions in Experiment 1, and in 
Experiment 2, the use of the last name label actually surpassed that of the disease label. 
When the results of Experiment 1 are combined with the 1st Judgment condition of 
Experiment 2, the disease label is seen to be used more frequently, but this difference is 
not significant. So was there an effect on label use by reordering the experiment? It 
seems that this is a possibility. When the VWM task preceded the similarity judgment 
task, the last name label was used with greater frequency, which was not the result in 
any other experimental condition. However, with only 46 participants completing the 
Judgment 2nd condition of Experiment 2, no sound conclusions can be made regarding 
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this finding; further experimentation with a larger amount of subjects would be required 
for a more accurate analysis.  
 
There were both expected and unexpected results found regarding the relationship 
between label use and VWM ability. A weak positive correlation was found between 
VWM ability and label use in the last name condition of the pilot study. This indicated 
that those with better VWM ability use labels more, not less as expected. However this is 
the only condition in which this occurred. In other conditions, it was typical that, in the 
last name condition, those with poor VWM used labels more, which was expected. The 
effect was not robust, however. The most significant correlations between VWM ability 
and label use were found when grouping Experiment 1 and the Judgment 1st condition of 
Experiment 2 together. However, in this final analysis, the correlations were not stronger 
than those found in the other experiments. This suggests that the lack of significance in 
the correlations may be due to a small sample size. 
 
Throughout the experiment, a participant‟s implicit beliefs were the measures that most 
closely related to label use consistently. Like in the VWM task, this was especially the 
case with the last name label. The relationship found between label use and implicit 
beliefs was unexpected, however. We predicted that participants with beliefs that traits 
in the world are fixed would use labels more because labels have been shown to affect 
decisions so strongly and because a large amount of information about the properties of 
an item can be given with a label. However, the opposite was found. The general trend 
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was that those with more flexible beliefs tended to use labels more, especially in the last 
name condition.   
 
Correlations between metacognitive ability and label use were not found to be 
significant. There was a weak, positive relationship between a participant‟s percentile 
estimations and label use; however this was not strong enough to be considered 
significant. In this study, metacognitive ability was not found to be strongly related to 
label use.  
 
Conclusions 
Across several measures, results for the Judgment 2nd condition varied from the other 
experiments in which the similarity judgment task was presented first. This suggests that 
label use or VWM ability may be affected by the previous task. After taking the VWM 
task in the Judgment 2nd condition of Experiment 2, subjects label use was less than that 
of other experiments for the most part, suggesting the VWM task results in a decreased 
use of labels in the future. This may be due to subjects being forced to think only 
visually during the VWM task, so when they begin the similarity judgment task, they are 
primed to think visually and therefore use labels less. However, due to the small number 
of participants in the Experiment 2 condition, further studies will need to be done to 
support this theory. 
 
  32 
Both VWM ability and implicit beliefs can potentially predict label use, however 
metacognitive ability does not. Furthermore, VWM ability and implicit beliefs were 
more closely related to the last name label use in general. In the case of those with low 
VWM ability, people tended to use labels more in the last name condition. Those with 
more flexible beliefs regarding traits and characteristics tend to use last names labels 
more. The frequency of the disease label use is steadier across these conditions. This 
suggests that people find the disease label more meaningful than the last name label 
because no matter what implicit beliefs are held, disease label use is frequent. While a 
last name can be changed quickly with the proper signatures, a disease can change the 
biological aspects of an organism. A disease can affect functioning, health, and even 
appearance. Although a last name can suggest a familiar relationship, it is very common 
to come across several people with the same last name that are unrelated and dissimilar. 
However, a disease tends to behave the same no matter which person it infects. Because 
the last name label holds less power, it is more susceptible to outside influences, such as 
implicit beliefs, resulting in the trend found. 
 
The interaction between label use and cognitive factors is not straight-forward. Many 
cognitive processes interact simultaneously during decisions. In order to have a better 
understanding of how people judge similarity and categorize items, further research 
needs to be done, channeling more specific aspects of cognition. This study serves as a 
launching point for future developments in determining how abilities and assumptions 
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affect people‟s vulnerability to believe that a label is a reflection of meaningful 
information.  
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APPENDIX 
 
FIGURES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. An example of stimuli used in the similarity judgment task shown A) 
without labels, and B) with labels. 
A) 
B) 
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Figure 2. Original, un-morphed face pairs used in similarity judgment 
task. The two faces within the same box were morphed together. 
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Figure 3. Two original, target faces emphasized and all morphed steps shown for 
the pair. 
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Figure 4. Sequence of stimuli shown in VWM task starting with A) the 
sample array, followed by B) a blank delay, then C) the test array. An 
example of an array used in the visual working memory task. 
Figure 5. Screenshot of implicit belief questionnaire as presented on MS Excel. 
A) B) C) 
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     Figure 6. Frequency, measured as a proportion, of selecting the dissimiliar 
picture in the similarity judgment task with standard error bars shown. 
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A) 
 
B) 
 
     Figure 7. Correlations between VWM ablility, according to percent correct, and 
label use. Figures shown with individual data plotted and corresponding trendlines. 
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C) 
 
 
D) 
 
Figure 7. Continued 
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A) 
 
B) 
 
     Figure 8. Correlations between implicit beliefs (0= traits are fixed; 7 = traits are 
flexible) and label use. Data shown with individual data and trendlines.  
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C) 
 
D) 
 
Figure 8. Continued 
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E) 
 
F) 
 
Figure 8. Continued 
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A) 
 
 
B) 
 
     Figure 9. Correlations between metacognitive ability and label use. Figures 
shown with individual data points and trendlines. 
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C) 
 
D) 
 
Figure 9. Continued 
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E) 
 
F) 
 
Figure 9.  Continued 
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     Figure 10. Correlations between VWM ability and label use in Experiment 1 and 
2. Shown with individual data points and trendline. 
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A) 
  
B) 
 
     Figure 11. Correlations between implicit beliefs and label use. Shown with 
individual data points and trendlines. 
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A) 
  
B) 
 
     Figure 12. Correlations between metacognitive ability and label use. Shown with 
individual data points and trend lines. 
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